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THE HOUSE ADVANTAGE: TRADE SECRET 
PROTECTIONS ON THE CASINO FLOOR1 
Kevin Johnson 
INTRODUCTION 
As long as there have been slot machines, there have been slot cheats. 
From the early days of slugs and shaving, to today’s more sophisticated 
cheaters who target a machine’s programing, cheating technology has 
developed in lock step with gaming technology. As a result, gaming operators 
and regulators are rarely surprised by what occurs within their casinos. 
However, occasionally a malicious act is so unexpected that it causes the entire 
industry to react. Generally speaking, these surprises are typically new 
techniques or devices that beat the machine. In July of 2013, it was who beat 
the machine. 
I.    “2341” KEYS AND ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE 
On July 12, 2013, Ryan Tors, the then-director of slot operations at the 
Peppermill Hotel and Casino in Reno, Nevada, was apprehended while using a 
“reset” key to access the diagnostic screens of slot machines at the Grand Sierra 
Resort, a local competitor.2 This “reset” key, also known across the industry as 
a “2341” or a butterfly key, allows a technician to place machines in or out of 
service, clear meters, or adjust a machine’s sound.3 It also allows access to the 
diagnostic information, play history, logs, and game configuration of the slot 
machine.4 Tors, however, was most interested in the theoretical hold percentage 
and theoretical payback percentage of the games, which his key allowed him to 
access.5 These settings dictate the amount that the machine will pay out over 
time and are provided to operators by manufactures on a “Probability 
Accounting Report,” or PAR sheet.6 As a result, they are commonly referred to 
                                                          
1 Special thanks to Chris Davis, Esq. of whose research and personal insights were 
vital when writing this article. 
2 Complaint at 5-6, St. Gaming Control Bd. vs. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., NGC 13–
23 (2014). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 6. 
6 See E. MALCOLM GREENLEES, CASINO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL 
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as the PARs of the machine.7 To understand why he was interested in these 
PARs, one must understand the trends occurring in the wider Reno market. 
Long before Tors set foot inside the Grand Sierra Resort, the Reno market 
had begun to flounder.8 In 2000, gaming revenues for the Reno-Sparks market 
hit a peak of between 1.2 and 1.3 billion dollars.9 Over the next ten years, these 
revenues would fall by nearly fifty percent.10 While there is no single reason for 
this collapse, the legalization of Indian gaming in California was particularly 
damaging to Reno’s casinos.11 Visitors from San Francisco and Sacramento 
who previously drove to Reno now had closer, nicer alternatives to “budget 
friendly” Reno.12 Moreover, gaming revenue’s downward trend accelerated 
with the great recession, which brought the entire industry to its knees.13 It was 
against this bleak backdrop that new ownership took over the Grand Sierra 
Resort.14 
Facing this threat to their market position and renewed competition, the 
Peppermill decided to take action. In an effort to understand their competitor’s 
strategic positions, management instructed Tors to systematically gather the 
PAR information of their competitors.15 He was able to collect this information 
by hacking machines throughout Reno from 2011 until he was detained by 
gaming control authorities on July 12, 2013.16 
As Tors was interrogated by gaming control agents, the value of this stolen 
information became clear. The theoretical payout percentage dictates how 
much a machine pays back over time.17 For example, if a machine’s pay out 
                                                          
MANAGEMENT 132–139 (1988); see also Sheryl L. Ashley, Understanding Slot 
Machine Math Basics, 25 INDIAN GAMING 1, 36 (Dec. 2015), http://www.indian 
gaming.com/istore/Dec15_Ashley.pdf. 
7 See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 139. 
8 William R. Eadington, Analyzing the Trends in Gaming-Based Tourism for the 
State of Nevada: Implications for Public Policy and Economic Development, 15 
UNLV GAMING RES. & REV. J. 1, 46 (2011) [hereinafter Eadington, Analyzing the 
Trends]. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 William R. Eadington, Richard H. Wells & Derek Gossi, Estimating the Impact 
of California Tribal Gaming on Demand for Casino Gaming in Nevada, 14 UNLV 
GAMING RES. & REV. J. 1, 44 (2010). 
12 See Eadington, Analyzing the Trends, supra note 8, at 46. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally GSR Changes Ownership, KOLO 8 NEWS NOW (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.kolotv.com/home/headlines/Grand_Sierra_Resort_Changes_Ownership
_116774664.html. 
15 See Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–6; see also Stipulation for Settlement and 
Order at 1, State Gaming Control Bd. v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., NCG-13–23 
(2014) (stating that Peppermill Casinos, Inc., admitted “each and every allegation 
set forth in the Complaint”). 
16 See Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15. 
17 See Ashley, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that when discussing a similar example, 
stating that a single player receiving this pay out “would most likely not be true in 
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percentage is set to ninety-five percent, it will pay back $0.95 of every dollar 
played into it.18 However, the average slot player does not see this kind of 
return.19 These percentages govern payouts over time, not to each individual 
player.20 This means that nearly everyone who plays a given machine will lose 
what they bet.21 However, that machine will eventually pay out a jackpot that is 
large enough to make the percentage accurate once again.22 The theoretical 
hold percentage is the inverse of the theoretical payout.23 If the payout is set to 
ninety-five percent, then the hold percentage is five percent. 
This information for a single machine at any point in time is functionally 
worthless. However, the PAR percentages of an entire casino floor or a specific 
popular game across the floor can be useful information; especially if this 
information is tracked and evaluated over time.24 It can indicate how “loose” or 
“tight” a property is relative to another and indicate wider trends that are 
occurring in the market.25 Moreover, if these percentages are known over a 
length of time, a casino could gain valuable insight into its competitor’s 
operational strategy and strategically position itself in the marketplace to 
maximize profits.26 
This possible window into the Grand Sierra Resort’s corporate strategy and 
improving market position is what interested Ryan Tors and the Peppermill. In 
an effort to protect the Peppermill’s position in the market, Ryan Tors had been 
systematically collecting this information from his competitors for years. This 
gave him the unique ability to fact-check his competitors’ marketing claims and 
undermine them. When a casino claimed to be the loosest, he knew exactly 
                                                          
real life due to the low amount of play”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (“1. The payback percentage – this is the theoretical percentage of what the 
customer should retain.”). 
20 Id. 
21 See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 132 (stating that some machines pay a “single 
jackpot that is sufficiently large to outweigh the lack of small payoffs,” while 
others are “multiple-payoff machine[s], which may have much more frequent but 
smaller payoffs”). 
22 Id. 
23 See Ashley, supra note 6, at 37 (“[T]he the casino reinvests the same dollar 
amount regardless of the hold percentage, thereby making the reinvestment 
percentages much larger on smaller theoretical holds (an inverse relationship).”); 
see also GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 132 (“The payoff schedules also relate to the 
use of casino hold percentages, a widely accepted procedure to be able to determine 
what a slot machine should theoretically hold, based on a given number of plays 
and the known reel patterns and payoff schedule.”). 
24 See GREENLEES, supra note 6, at 138 (“Hold percentage is a vital management 
concept in the casino and is very important in the slot machine area.”) 
25 Id. at 132 (“The comparison of theoretical hold percentage and actual hold 
percentage can form the basis for diagnostic and managerial analysis of slot 
operating results.”) 
26 Id. 
JOHNSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2018 1:11 PM 
124 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:121 
how loose they were and could react quickly. More importantly, armed with 
this information, the Peppermill could know exactly how much it had to adjust 
its machines to undercut the competition without lowering their hold 
percentages too much and impairing profitability. For example, a nickel 
machine might have four possible theoretical payout settings, 97%, 95%, 93%, 
and 91%. One of the Peppermill’s competitors might claim the loosest nickel 
slots in town and have its machines set at ninety-three percent. Without 
knowing this setting, the only way the Peppermill could positively make the 
same claim would be to set its machines to the highest possible payout settings 
— in this case, ninety-seven percent. Any other setting, and the Peppermill 
could not know that its advertising is accurate. However, if it knew that its 
competitor set their machines to ninety-three percent and claimed to have the 
loosest machines in town, the Peppermill could set its nickel slots to ninety-five 
percent and take the title for itself without having to sacrifice two percent of all 
its nickel slot play. In short, thanks to its casino spy, the Peppermill eliminated 
much of the guesswork inherent in operating a slot floor while maximizing 
their possible profits. 
When Tors was finally caught and turned over to gaming control 
authorities, the depth and scope of this scheme gradually began to unfold. 
Through their investigation, the Gaming Control Board discovered several 
important facts. First, Mr. Tors had been active in gaming properties 
throughout Reno.27 Second, it became clear that Tors was acting “in the course 
and scope of his employment,” and that the Peppermill Casinos’ management 
“knew of, approved of, and directed Mr. Tors’ conduct of obtaining theoretical 
hold percentage information from the slot machines of other casinos using a 
‘reset’ key.”28 As a result of these facts, the Peppermill was fined one million 
dollars, which represented the one of the largest fines ever levied by the 
Nevada Gaming Commission at the time.29 The Peppermill’s electronic 
espionage also led to other changes in the industry. Primarily, gaming 
regulators in Nevada mandated new procedures and controls for “2341” keys 
and the employees that have access to them statewide.30 
                                                          
27 In addition to the Grand Sierra Resort, Tors had keyed machines at the (a) 
Eldorado Hotel and Casino, Reno, Nevada; (b) Circus Circus Hotel/Casino, Reno, 
Reno Nevada; (c) Siena Hotel Spa Casino, Reno, Nevada; (d) Tamarack Junction, 
Reno, Nevada; (e) Wendover Nugget Hotel & Casino, Wendover, Nevada; (f) Red 
Garter Hotel & Casino, Wendover, Nevada; (g) Atlantis Casino Resort, Reno, 
Nevada; (h) Hobey’s Casino, Sun Valley, Nevada; (i) Rail City Casino, Sparks, 
Nevada; and (j) Baldini’s Sports Casino, Sparks, Nevada. See Complaint, supra 
note 2, at 6. 
28 Id. 
29 Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 2; Howard Stutz, Inside 
Gaming: Fattest Fines Have Come in a Flurry, L.V. REV.- J. (Mar. 23, 2014, 8:12 
AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/business-columns/inside-gaming/ 
inside-gaming-fattest-fines-have-come-in-a-flurry/. 
30 See Bill O’Driscoll, Nevada Regulators: Slot Reset Keys Give Limited Access, 
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Eventually, the Peppermill’s breaches led to civil actions as well. The 
Grand Sierra Resort filed a civil suit seeking damages against the Peppermill.31 
The Grand Sierra Resort alleged, among other things, that the information 
stolen amounted to a trade secret that the Peppermill had misappropriated. The 
ensuing litigation raised novel issues never before examined by any court — 
namely, whether the PAR settings maintained by a company could be held as a 
trade secret. 
II.    TRADE SECRETS GENERALLY 
Protecting trade secrets is not a novel concept. Scholars have traced the 
concept of a “trade secret” back to the ancient Roman practice known as actio 
servi corrupti, interpreted as an “action for making a slave worse.”32 
Essentially, this idea meant that a “Roman owner of a mark or firm name was 
legally protected against unfair usage by a competitor. . .”33 Essentially, “actio 
servi corrupti [allowed authorities] to grant commercial relief under the guise 
of private legal actions.”34 A more recognizable form of trade secret law 
emerged in 1817 with the English case Newbery v. James.35 This case involved 
the unsuccessful attempt to prevent the disclosure of a secret invention.36 
Despite being unsuccessful, this case marks the first time an issue was 
discussed in a way that would foreshadow future trade secret cases.37 Vickery v. 
Welch marks the first American consideration of a trade secret case, where the 
Massachusetts’s Supreme Court considered the sale of a secret chocolate 
making method.38 
Trade secret law continued to grow on both sides of the Atlantic until 
finally making an appearance in the Restatement (First) of Torts published by 
the American Law Institute in 1939.39 In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court cleared 
the way for states to develop their own trade secret protections.40 Shortly 
thereafter, states began to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. To date, forty-
                                                          
RENO GAZETTE J. (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.rgj.com/story/money/gaming/2014/ 
02/21/nevada-regulators-slot-reset-keys-give-limited-access/5702819/. 
31 See Order, MEI-GSR Holdings LLC v. Peppermill Casinos Inc., CVlS-01704 
(S.J.D.C.Nev., Aug. 27, 2014). 
32 A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011, 1013 (Ch. 1817). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 523 (1 Pick. 1837). 
39 See Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (Am. Law Inst. 1939) (stating that “one 
who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, with or without a privilege to do so, is 
liable to the other” if certain conditions are satisfied). 
40 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 470 (1974). 
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nine states have done so, along with Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands.41 At the federal level, the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996 made it a federal crime to misappropriate trade secrets for the benefit of a 
foreign government.42 Most recently, the federal government passed the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act which, for the first time, provided owners of trade secrets 
with a private civil right of action at the federal level.43 
A. Approaching Trade Secrets Today 
Nonetheless, trade secrets law is not easily understood. In fact, legal 
scholars cannot agree among themselves what trade secret law actually is.44 
Traditionally, trade secret law stems in part from intellectual property theory 
and part from tort theory.45 On one hand, trade secrets convey property rights to 
the holder of the trade secret as a patent or trademark would.46 On the other, 
they seek the “deterrence of wrongful acts . . . [and] to punish and prevent illicit 
behavior, and even to uphold reasonable standards of commercial behavior,” 
which makes them more punitive in nature, similar to an action in tort.47 
Likewise, trade secrets have been alternatively described as a collateral 
issue of contract law, a question of property law, and even a question of 
“commercial morality,” based in the inherent equitable powers of a court.48 
Other legal theorists reject these approaches altogether and call trade secret law 
a “collection of other legal norms . . . united only by the fact that they are used 
to protect secret information.”49 These scholars view trade secret law as nothing 
more than an attempt to provide a remedy for conduct that “feels” wrong. 
Each of these approaches has its strengths and its weaknesses and trade 
secret law integrates aspects of all of them. With time however, the intellectual 
property theory of trade secrets has taken over as the prevailing justification for 
this area of law, although elements of torts and contract law persist.50 This 
unique character has required both judicial and legislative adjustments to make 
                                                          
41 Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%2
0Act (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012). 
43 Id, § 1836. 
44 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13 (2008). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 319. 
48 See id. at 329. 
49 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998). 
50 See Lemley supra note 44, at 363 (“While the theoretical justifications for trade 
secret law historically have been more varied and controversial than for patent or 
copyright, courts and scholars increasingly theorize trade secret law as a subset of 
intellectual property because it encourages information production.”) 
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the theory practicable. “Secrecy” and “independent economic value” have 
become substitutes for other factors commonly evaluated in intellectual 
property cases such as ownership, authorship, or originality.51 These 
adjustments form the basis of any trade secret analysis and are codified in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act as adopted by most states. Under the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, a “trade secret” is defined as: 
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
 (i) derives independent economic value, actual or 
 potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
 being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
 other persons who can obtain economic value from 
 its disclosure or use, and 
 (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under 
 the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.52 
The elements contained in this definition are at the center of trade secret 
litigation. Therefore, this article will analyze them in turn against the nature of 
PAR information and the facts of the Peppermill case. 
III.    WHAT ARE TRADE SECRETS? 
Unlike patents, trademarks, or copyrights, trade secrets do not have the 
benefit of clearly defined subject matter or judicial frameworks. This has led to 
a variety of outcomes and a relative uncertainty behind each trade secret action. 
These outcomes often directly contradict each other as the same potential trade 
secret is tried in different courts and results in different outcomes. For instance, 
some courts have held that Scientology’s religious texts are trade secrets on the 
grounds that they have licensing value.53 While other courts have held that 
these same texts cannot be trade secrets as they are religious and not 
commercial in nature.54 Likewise, restaurant recipes have been considered trade 
secrets in some courts and denied protection in others.55 Sometimes rulings turn 
on semantics as the same concept under different names finds different results 
in different courts.56 Other times there is no identifiable rationale behind the 
                                                          
51 See id. at 244–46. 
52 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (1985). 
53 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 
1231, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
54 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 1986). 
55 See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 72 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
buffet’s recipes were not trade secrets); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. 
Supp. 1405, 1429 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that a bagel recipe was a trade secret). 
56 Compare Astro Tech., Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., Civ. No. AH-03-0745, 
2005 WL 6061803 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that a “generalized” plan for reaching 
a “general” goal was not a trade secret), with Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 
118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that a “business philosophy” 
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decisions. For instance, nearly every type of financial record a business can 
produce has been designated as both a trade secret and not a trade secret.57 
Facing this confusion, scholars have attempted to establish a baseline 
understanding of what a trade secret is. Some may look at the factual 
circumstances and identify certain situations as more likely to give rise to trade 
secrets, such as competitive intelligence, certain business transactions, and 
departing employees.58 Others look for characteristics of the trade secret itself 
to establish a framework that could be used to identify other trade secrets. 
These traits include whether the secret is worth clawing back after release, 
discreteness of the secret, or spoilability, among others.59 Despite how 
unsettled this area of law is among scholars, as a practical matter, the courts 
and legislators have reduced trade secrets to a two-factor test.60 First, is the 
information secret? Secrecy is “indispensable to an effective allegation of a 
trade secret,” is a question of fact, and must be claimed and maintained by the 
party claiming a trade secret. 61 Second, the holder must “derive independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from [the information] not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means.”62 
Applying this mess of authority to the chaos of a casino is not easy. There 
are only a few cases that have attempted to do this, and they have focused on 
issues only tangentially related to gaming such as casino player information.63 
Moreover, the analysis performed in these cases has been less focused on the 
trade secret analysis itself and more focused on collateral issues such as non-
compete clauses, and are therefore of little value to this analysis. Rather, this 
article will be an organic review of the events that occurred in Reno and 
applicable case law out of multiple jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act or similar legislation. 
IV.    SECRECY: THE FOUNDATION OF TRADE SECRETS 
What occurred in Reno at the Grand Sierra Resort is an interesting case 
study in secrecy and efforts to maintain it for the purposes of trade secret law. 
Like many trade secrets, PARs are inherently secret. Unless explained to them, 
                                                          
was protectable as a trade secret). 
57 See, e.g. Prairie Island v. Minn. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 658 N.W.2d 876, 890 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that consolidated balance sheets, cash-flow 
statements, and profit-and-loss statements were not trade secrets); RKI, Inc. v. 
Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that financial 
information in a company’s database is a trade secret). 
58 Lemley, supra note 44, at 318. 
59 Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 560-61 
(2010). 
60 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (1985). 
61 1-1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.03 (2015). 
62 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii). 
63 See Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 161 (Nev. 2016). 
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the average player would not even know that they existed and were shaping the 
course of their evening spent gambling.64 However, their secrecy can be 
pierced by an individual with the right knowledge and skills. Armed with the 
proper mathematical formulas and data, PARs can be accurately reversed 
engineered.65 This dismantling of a secret is often put forth as a defense to trade 
secret cases. After all, if a trade secret is easily determined by competitors, can 
it really be considered a secret? 
There is no dispute that PARs can be reversed engineered by someone who 
has the knowledge to do so and access to a slot floor’s data.66 Without access to 
floor data, experts in slot operation can utilize complicated formulas for 
determining what a casino’s PARS are. All of these techniques require 
extensive slot play and complex mathematical formulas to evaluate the data 
collected while playing. Five of these schemes — the request, ratio analysis, 
ratio elimination, blind bin analysis, and minimal bin analysis — require in 
depth knowledge of a casino’s player loyalty programs.67 Other methods, 
termed video deconstruction or fingerprinting of real trip elimination, require 
employees to secretly and repeatedly photograph the slot machine while it is 
being played.68 The question is whether or not being reverse engineer-able 
through these means defeats trade secret protection. 
Multiple courts have evaluated the ease of a reverse engineering defense. 
In AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the Eighth Circuit held 
that revised helicopter overhaul specifications were trade secrets under the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act.69 Rolls-Royce developed and produced engines 
used in both civilian and military helicopters.70 A subsidiary of Rolls-Royce 
was tasked with developing modifications to these engines and issued 
proprietary instructions for doing so.71 These instructions were used by 
AvidAir without authorization and became the subject of this suit.72 Even 
though the revisions were “relatively minor” updates from publicly available 
information, and the defendant could have easily received “FAA approval for a 
procedure that [was] based on only publicly available information . . . [the 
defendant’s] repeated attempts to secure the revised [overhaul information] 
without [the plaintiff’s] approval belie[d] its claim that the information in the 
                                                          
64 See supra Part I. 
65 See generally Ashley, supra note 6. 
66 See id. 
67 These methods are largely proprietary themselves and developed and employed 
by various experts in the field. 
68 Id. 
69 AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 969 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 969–70. 
72 Id. at 970. 
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documents” was easily reverse engineered and not secret.73 The court reasoned 
“[e]ven if information potentially could have been duplicated by other proper 
means, it is no defense to claim that one’s product could have been developed 
independently of plaintiff’s, if in fact it was developed by using plaintiff’s 
proprietary designs.”74 
Likewise, in K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., the 
Texas Supreme Court held that a magnetic fishing tool was a trade secret.75 In 
doing so, the court found that the tool could be easily duplicated “by an 
examination of the tool without disassembling it,” and wasn’t obviously secret 
at all.76 However, the court reasoned that because defendant “did not learn how 
to make the [plaintiff’s] tool or a device similar thereto by observing it in an 
assembled or unbroken condition, but learned of its internal proportions, 
qualities, and mechanisms, by taking it apart despite an agreement that it would 
not do so” they could not later argue it was not a trade secret.77 The court 
further held that when “a trade secret is of such a nature that it can be 
discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful means does not deprive 
its owner of the right to protection. . .”78 In other words, even if a trade secret 
can easily be determined through lawful means such as reverse engineering, it 
can still be considered secret. 
Other courts have held that for this defense to work, the trade secret must 
be ascertained “quickly” or be so “self-revealing” to be ascertainable “at a 
glance.”79 This line of thinking has lead courts to require speed and efficiency 
to reverse engineering for the defense to be persuasive.80 Courts generally look 
                                                          
73 Id. at 973–75. 
74 Id. at 973. 
75 See K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782, 
793 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1958). 
76 Id. at 786-87. 
77 See id. at 787. 
78 See id. at 788. 
79 See Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at *19 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that trade secret protection is applicable assuming 
the secret does “not involve self-revealing information that any user or passer-by 
sees at a glance”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) 
(specifying that the protected information need not “be unascertainable at all by 
proper means, but only that they not be readily or quickly ascertainable by such 
means”); Nat’l Instrument Labs., Inc. v. Hycel, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1179, 1181–82 
(D. Del. 1979) (stating that secrets that are “ascertainable at a glance” will lose 
protections); see also Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374-75 (7th Cir. 1953) 
(holding that cargo container, available on the open market and accessible to 
defendant for inspection, was a protectable trade secret because there was no 
evidence that the “construction of which was ascertainable at a glance”). 
80  See CheckPoint Fluidic Sys. Int’l, Ltd. v. Guccione, 888 F. Supp. 2d 780, 797 
(E.D. La. 2012) (holding even though “pumps can be reverse engineered does not 
bar a trade secret claim, as long as the pumps cannot be reverse engineered so 
quickly as to be ‘readily ascertainable’”); Rycoline Products, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 
A.2d 1047, 1055 (N. J. App. Div. 2000) (stating that to be readily ascertainable, 
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at the average knowledge and capabilities of the industry to determine the 
required speed and efficiency of reverse engineering. 81 
Here, reverse engineerability should not defeat secrecy when discussing 
PARs. Even if they could be reverse engineered, this fact alone is not enough to 
prevent trade secret protection. They must also be quickly and easily reverse 
engineered “at a glance.”82 Requiring experts and complicated formulas to 
mount a defense undermines the ability to argue that reverse engineering is 
easy or quick. The helicopter designs in Rolls Royce were clear to anyone in the 
industry and easily recreated. Likewise, the magnetic fishing tool in K & G Oil 
was a simple product by any standard. Both trade secrets where simpler and 
easier to reverse engineer then PARs and yet both were still considered trade 
secrets. 
There is no case law that allows a defendant to claim that the complicated 
observation and mathematical formulas necessary to determine the PARs of a 
casino can justify reverse engineering as a defense. Even if there was, the fact 
that the PARs in a single machine and across the casino floor are so quickly 
and easily changed makes it even harder to show that they could be easily 
reverse engineered. By the time an agent had observed a machine long enough 
and collected enough data to determine the PARs, the settings could easily be 
changed once again. This variability is a serious obstacle to reverse engineering 
and explains why a party seeking this information would have to steal it. 
Finally, it is important to note even the best formula deployed by the most 
capable expert can only approximate the PARs across the casino floor. They 
may be able to get very close, but they cannot determine PARs with exactness. 
There are too many machines on the floor and too many possible variables for 
this calculation to work. This lack of definiteness further undermines the claim 
that the PARs aren’t secret and easily reversed engineered. In short, reverse 
engineering is only a defense if it can be done quickly, easily, and accurately. 
PARs are sufficiently difficult to reverse engineer and so easily varied that they 
cannot likely be reverse engineered quickly, easily, and accurately. However, 
even if the Peppermill could not successfully claim reverse engineering as a 
defense, this is not the end of the secrecy analysis. 
A. The Secrecy Analysis Beyond Reverse Engineering 
Declaring something “secret” has its reasonable limits when determining 
whether or not it can effectively be reverse engineered. An aggrieved business 
owner can’t simply declare information as secret once they allow it to become 
                                                          
defendant must demonstrate that the information can be ascertained quickly). 
81 See Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. v. Serv-Tech, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 89, 111 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that to be a protected trade secret, “the trade secret 
must not be generally known to or used by the industry or a matter completely 
disclosed or ascertainable at a glance”). 
82 See e.g. Motorola, Inc., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at *19. 
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widely known and then attempt to file suit. In other words, one cannot “claw-
back” trade secrets once they are made public.83 To embody this principle, the 
secrecy requirement of trade secrets often morphs into an analysis of a party’s 
reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. In E.I. duPont deNemours & 
Co. v. Christopher, the defendants were photographers hired by an unknown 
third party to take aerial photographs of new construction at the Plaintiff’s 
industrial plant.84 The Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment 
arguing that they were in public airspace and that the plant’s design was not 
kept secret.85 The Fifth Circuit held that fencing and maintaining security at the 
site were sufficient efforts to maintain secrecy and upheld the district court’s 
denial of summary judgment.86 
Likewise, other courts have approved of pedestrian measures undertaken 
by the plaintiffs to protect their trade secrets. In Matter of Innovative Const. 
Sys., Inc., the court held that even though plaintiff “did not employ security 
personnel, and the plant was not locked during working hours” formulas were 
considered reasonably protected trade secrets because they “were kept in a 
notebook in the plant manager’s office, and hence out of view.”87 A similar 
holding was reached in Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., which 
also dealt with an unguarded plant and employees that were not instructed as to 
secrecy.88 The court held that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to protect its 
trade secret, since “plaintiffs took some steps to keep its operations 
confidential” even though “these measures admittedly were not stringent 
enough to withstand a deliberate spying attempt.”89 
Other courts have applied a similar test and found the efforts taken to 
maintain secrecy insufficient.90 Looking at the entirety of the situation 
surrounding claimed trade secrets, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Electro-
Craft Corp v. Controlled Motion, Inc. found that “fatally lax” security measures 
were insufficient to sustain a trade secret claim.91 These failings included a 
failure to mark technical documents, drawings, and diagrams as “confidential” 
when they were distributed to customers and vendors, unrestricted employee 
access to confidential documents, and a failure to properly train staff on 
                                                          
83 See generally Johnson, supra note 59. 
84 See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
85 See id. at 1014. 
86 See id. at 1015–16. 
87 See Matter of Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 884-85 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
88 See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
89 Id. 
90 See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 902-03 
(Minn. 1983). 
91 See id. at 902. 
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document secrecy.92 Informal tours of the facilities where products were being 
made and plans were stored also contributed to an environment incapable of 
producing trade secrets.93 
Casinos have protections in place to keep their PARs secret. First, PARs 
are only accessible by a physical key.94 More importantly, casinos are required 
to follow extensive minimal control standards to protect the integrity of their 
machines.95 These measures include quarterly inventories of all “2341” keys 
and other instruments that provide any access to this data as well as 
investigations of any keys that are unaccounted for.96 However, it should be 
noted that despite the security in casinos, the “2341” keys in question are 
readily available. At the time of this writing, used “2341” keys were available 
for purchase by anyone online.97 Since the incident in Reno, Nevada gaming 
regulators have required increased security measures surrounding reset keys at 
all properties in the state.98 This state action along with the wide availability of 
the keys undercuts the contention that the keys were useful to secure the 
secrecy of trade secrets. Likewise, the other security measures in place have 
nothing to do with trade secrets, but were designed to prevent cheating, 
stealing, and other conventional crimes on the casino floor.99 
                                                          
92 See id.at 903. 
93 See id. 
94 See Bill O’Driscoll, Nevada Regulators: Slot Reset Keys Give Limited Access, 
L.V. REV.-J. (Feb. 22, 2014), https://www.rgj.com/story/money/gaming/2014/02/ 
21/nevada-regulators-slot-reset-keys-give-limited-access/5702819/ 
95 See NEV. GAMING CONTROL BD., VERSION 8, MINIMUM INTERNAL STANDARDS: 
GROUP 1 LICENSEES, http://gaming.nv.gov/index.aspx?page=182 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2018). 
96 See id. Such measures are explicitly defined within the Nevada Gaming Control 
Board’s minimum internal standards as follows: 
205. Quarterly, an inventory of all slot machine door keys, 
reset keys, 2341 keys, attendant keys, any other similar slot 
key or device, slot fill cabinet keys, count room, drop box 
release, storage rack and contents keys is performed, and 
reconciled to records of keys made, issued, and destroyed. 
Investigations are performed for all keys unaccounted for, 
with the investigation being documented.  
97 See Howard Stutz, Slot Machine Keys Sold Online but Are They Useful?, WASH. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/14/slot-
machine-keys-sold-online-but-are-they-useful/; see also EBAY, http://www.ebay 
.com/itm/Attendant-reset-keys-2341 
/121746934761?hash=item1c58aecbe9:g:H0UAAOSwHnFVu6z- (last visited Mar. 
27, 2018) (showing an example of “2341” keys available for purchase online). 
98 See Stutz, supra note 97. 
99 These measures include security cameras, on floor personal, and other visible 
means employed by the casino to watch patrons suspected of cheating. Likewise, 
dealers and other employees follow strict procedures when beginning and ending 
their shifts to maintain the integrity of each casino game. See NEV. GAMING 
CONTROL BD., SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS FOR NON-RESTRICTED LICENSEES, 
http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=2944 (last visited 
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Attacking the security measures in place is common and may make logical 
sense, but doing so is undermined by the established case law. The court in 
DuPont held that a party claiming trade secret protections did not have to take 
extreme and unorthodox measures to protect their trade secrets.100 Requiring a 
casino to put extra protections in place for their trade secrets would be akin to 
requiring the plaintiff in DuPont to put a massive roof over their factory. It 
would not be practical or fair to require such lengths to protect their trade 
secrets. 
Courts have codified this principle into common law. The court in Electro-
Craft found security measures lacking, as the basic requirements common in 
the industry were not being followed.101 Failure to implement these industry 
norms rendered the plaintiff’s precautions “fatally lax.”102 In the casino, the 
theft of PAR information is unprecedented. As such, established security 
measures were not prepared to handle it.103 However, the measures in place, as 
a whole, were in no means “fatally lax.” This is evidenced by the fact that 
hundreds of slot cheats are captured each year as they attempt to tamper with 
machines.104 As you will recall from the Peppermill case, Mr. Tors was 
captured as he attempted to misappropriate trade secrets from his 
competitors.105 However, even if the Grand Sierra Resort’s security measures 
hadn’t been effective, the court in Hickory made it clear that security measures 
need not withstand “a deliberate spying attempt.”106 By evaluating these facts 
and the relevant case law, it is clear that casino security systems are more than 
sufficient to maintain the secrecy of PAR information. 
Finally, it is possible to inadvertently publish your trade secret and lose any 
protection you may have been entitled to.107 When dealing with PAR 
information, this mistaken disclosure would likely look like a marketing 
campaign or other public statement by the casino. A casino may advertise that 
                                                          
Mar. 27, 2018). 
100 See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-
17 (5th Cir. 1970). 
101 Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Minn. 
1983). 
102 Id. at 902. 
103 Id. 
104 For example, the Nevada Gaming Control Board had 574 arbitration cases in 
2015, disputing $51.8 million, and made 602 criminal arrests of attempted cheats. 
Further, between 250 to 500 casino employees are arrested by the Gaming Control 
Board each year. See Nicole Raz, Basic Casino Cheating Scams Hardest to Catch, 
L.V. REV.-J. (Sep. 26, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/ 
casinos-gaming/basic-casino-cheating-scams-hardest-to-catch-gaming-experts-say/. 
105 Complaint, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
106 Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L Labs., Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1979). 
107 AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 975 (8th 
Cir. 2011); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 381 F.3d 811, 
819 (8th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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they have the loosest casino in town. They may advertise that a popular game 
found at every casino pays out the most at their property. For example, the 
“Buffalo” is a nickel slot machine that is among the most popular games on any 
casino floor.108 Promoting the loosest Buffalo machines in town would be a 
good way to win over local, frequent gamblers who play only this specific 
machine. As these machines are so common, the PAR settings for them would 
likely be widely known to the other operators in town. So, by advertising the 
loosest PAR settings in town, a casino would essentially be publishing their 
exact PARs on this game to all of their competitors and they would no longer 
be secret. 
Even if the Grand Sierra Resort had published their PAR information in 
this way, many trade secrets cases deal with expressly public information, 
which is not a bar to trade secret protection. In Avidair, the information had 
been made expressly public through the Federal Aviation Administration and it 
was still found to be a trade secret.109 Likewise, in Conseco Fin. Servicing 
Corp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., the court evaluated whether marketing “lead 
sheets” could be considered trade secrets.110 These sheets were “accessible to 
the public,” but were still deemed trade secrets because the information they 
contained could not “be obtained from alternative sources.”111 In Clark v. 
Bunker, information in a plan for marketing prepaid funeral services was still 
considered a trade secret despite being contained in brochures distributed to the 
public.112 In short, the secrecy required for trade secret protection is not total or 
complete secrecy, and may not be automatically defeated simply because some 
PARs are potentially ascertainable from public advertisements. 
As the preeminent element behind trade secret cases, secrecy is 
complicated but vital. The very nature of PARs and slot machine data speaks to 
their being secret. Likewise, PARs are not sufficiently public or obvious to be 
reversed engineered without considerable effort. Finally, casinos generally have 
substantial security measures in place to protect their operations and by 
extension their PAR data. Taking all of these factors together, theoretical hold 
percentages in a casino generally meet the secrecy requirements to gain trade 
secret protection. As in many trade secret cases, this secrecy surrounding PARs 
is tied directly into the misappropriation that occurs on a case by case basis. 
 
 
                                                          
108 See Aristocrat Performs Strongly in Latest Eilers-Fantini Quarterly Slot Survey, 
MARKET WIREd (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ 
aristocrat-performs-strongly-in-latest-eilers-fantini-quarterly-slot-survey-
2092977.htm. 
109 AvidAir, 663 F.3d at 975. 
110 Conseco, 381 F.3d at 819. 
111 Id. 
112 Clark, 453 F.2d at 1010. 
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V.    MISAPPROPRIATION AND USE OF PARS AS TRADE SECRETS 
Nevada and other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act provide three alternative definitions for “misappropriation.”113 The Nevada 
Uniform Trade Secret Act defines “misappropriation” as: 
(a) Acquisition of the trade secret of another by a person 
by improper means; 
(b) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person 
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret 
was acquired by improper means; or 
(c) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without 
express or implied consent by a person who: 
 (1) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of 
 the trade secret;114 
Each one of these definitions requires that the trade secret be gained through 
improper means. “Improper means” is defined as: 
(a) Theft; (b) Bribery; (c) Misrepresentation; (d) Willful 
breach or willful inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy; (e) Willful breach or willful 
inducement of a breach of a duty imposed by common 
law, statute, contract, license, protective order or other 
court or administrative order; and (f) Espionage through 
electronic or other means.115 
Likewise, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. f, 
states: “When a defendant has engaged in egregious misconduct in order to 
acquire the information, the inference that the information is sufficiently 
inaccessible to qualify for protection as a trade secret is particularly strong.”116 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court held that trade secret law “does not 
offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means,” however, it does 
protect “the holder of a trade secret against disclosure or use when the 
knowledge is gained, not by the owner’s volition, but by some ‘improper 
means.’”117 
Misappropriation is a vital part of any trade secret claim. In Saturn Sys., 
Inc. v. Militare, the court held that under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, a claim 
for misappropriation requires proof of “acquisition of a trade secret of another 
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means” such as theft.118 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 
                                                          
113 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010, 030(2) (2016). 
114 Id. § 600A.030(2). 
115 Id. § 600A.030(1). 
116 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. f. (Am. Law. Inst. 1995). 
117 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475–76 (1974). 
118 Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 525 (Colo. App. 2011). 
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also held that to “establish a trade secret misappropriation claim” under the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act, a plaintiff must “demonstrate (1) the existence of a 
trade secret; and (2) acquisition of the trade secret by improper means, or 
improper use or disclosure by one under a duty not to disclose”119 Multiple 
other courts who have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act have reached 
similar conclusions.120 
The confluence of misappropriation and secrecy is illustrated in Reingold 
v. Swiftships, Inc.121 The Fifth Circuit held that a boat hull mold was entitled to 
protection as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secret Act.122 This ruling 
was based on the mold still being a secret even though defendant “could have 
reverse engineered a mold from an existing hull,” because the defendant did not 
create the infringing mold from an existing hull, but instead “misappropriated 
the trade secret” by improper means.123 The parties to this action had entered 
into a contract that required payment each time the mold was used and 
notification of any adjustments made to the mold.124 Swiftships began to use 
the mold to construct an order of hulls for an international client without paying 
or notifying Reingold.125 This breach of contract was held to be “improper 
means” of appropriating the trade secret.126 The fact that the hull design could 
have been used legally if the terms of the contract were followed was 
immaterial.127 The court stated that “protection will be accorded to a trade 
secret holder against disclosure or unauthorized use gained by improper means, 
                                                          
119 DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2007). 
120 See, e.g. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 589 (Del. Ch. 2010) aff’d 
sub nom. ASDI, Inc. v. Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010) (holding, 
under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, to “maintain a successful claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must show both the existence of a 
trade secret and its misappropriation” “through the acquisition of a trade secret of 
another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means”); BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 
677, 683 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sip-Top, Inc. v. Ekco Group, Inc., 86 F.3d 827, 
833 (8th Cir. 1996)) (holding that misappropriation of a trade secret is established 
by “(1) improper acquisition of a trade secret” such as by theft; “or (2) disclosure or 
use of a trade secret without consent”); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 
245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding under the Uniform Trade Secret Act 
that a “misappropriation occurs when one acquires the secret information ‘by 
improper means’ or discloses the secret information acquired by ‘improper 
means’”); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346, 
350 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secret Act “prohibits the 
improper acquisition of a trade secret, whether or not the secret is used”). 
121 Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 650-52 (5th Cir. 1997). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 651–52. 
124 Id. at 650. 
125 Id. at 650–51. 
126 Id. at 650. 
127 Id. at 651. 
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even if others might have discovered the trade secret by legitimate means.”128 
This holding is not unique. “The fact that a trade secret . . . can be 
discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful means does not deprive 
its owner of the right to protection from those who would secure possession of 
it by unfair means.”129 Likewise, stealing a trade secret is “evidence [that] 
supports a finding that [the trade secret] was not readily ascertainable” and 
therefore “deserves protection as a trade secret.”130 
It is important to note that to be considered misappropriation, the action 
does not necessarily have to be illegal. Returning to E.I. DuPont DeNemours & 
Co. v. Christopher, the Fifth Circuit held that “aerial photography of plant 
construction [to determine another’s secret manufacturing process] is an 
improper means of obtaining another’s trade secret.”131 The Fifth Circuit 
reached this holding even though the defendant “violated no government 
aviation standard, did not breach any confidential relation, and did not engage 
in any fraudulent or illegal conduct.”132 The court did find however, that this 
conduct fell well “below the generally accepted standards of commercial 
morality and reasonable conduct.”133 This ruling was based on the premise that 
the court would not “require a person or corporation to take unreasonable 
precautions to prevent another from doing that which he ought not to do in the 
first place.”134 Put a different way, “thou shall not appropriate a trade secret 
through deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are 
not reasonably available.”135 
Examining what happened in Reno, there is little doubt that the PARs in 
question where misappropriated through improper means. Upon investigation 
by Gaming Control officials, it became immediately clear that the Peppermill 
was conducting a systematic and purposeful effort to steal information from 
their competitors.136 As a result of these findings, the Peppermill was fined one 
million dollars by the Control Board which represented one of the largest fines 
ever assessed in Nevada up to this point.137 The more interesting question that 
came out of Reno is not whether the PARs had been misappropriated, but if use 
of the PARs is required for them to be misappropriated. If the Peppermill could 
                                                          
128 Id. at 652. 
129 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953). 
130 DPT Labs., Ltd. v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., No. CIV.SA-98-CA-664-JWP, 
1999 WL 33289709, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1999). 
131 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
132 Id. at 1014. 
133 Id. at 1016. 
134 Id. at 1017. 
135 Id. 
136 Complaint, supra note 2, at 6. 
137 See Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 2; see also Stutz, 
supra note 29. 
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show that what happened in Reno was simply the obsession of an over-eager 
employee that management was foolish enough to indulge, could it still be 
misappropriation? 
A. Equating Use and Misappropriation 
Defendants often attempt to substitute a “use” analysis for 
misappropriation. They reason that if information is not used, then the 
misappropriation did not occur. While this may seem logical, this approach is 
not supported by established case law. In Binary Semantics Ltd. v. Minitab, 
Inc., logic demanded that the court find that a “theft of trade secrets necessarily 
implies that they will be used.”138 Likewise, in RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, the court 
held that, in several situations, use of trade secrets gained during the course of 
employment would be inevitable when an employee changed jobs.139 Whether 
it was proven or not, the former employee and his new employer “unlawfully 
misappropriated [his former employer’s] trade secret information because it is 
inevitable [that the employee] will use the information he obtained.”140 The 
court noted that “direct evidence of theft and use of trade secrets is often not 
available,” and therefore “the plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to 
prove misappropriation.”141 Applying this standard, the court concluded, that 
the former employer had “proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [the 
former employee and his new employer had] misappropriated its trade 
secrets.”142 The court also relied on circumstantial evidence in Uhlig LLC v. 
Shirley.143 Even without presenting “much, if any, direct evidence of use of the 
compilation trade secrets,” by proving that the employee took “confidential and 
trade secret information,” the former employer provided “the jury with 
substantial circumstantial evidence from which it could have determined that 
[the employee] actually used the information.”144 
In PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an 
employee “pursuing and accepting his new job” with a direct competitor was 
enough to conclude that the employee would “inevitably. . .rely on” his 
knowledge to benefit his new employer.145 The court reached this conclusion 
                                                          
138 Binary Semantics Ltd. v. Minitab, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:07-CV-1750, 2008 
WL 763575, at 4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008). 
139 RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
140 Id. at 875. 
141 Id. at 876. 
142 Id. at 877. 
143 Uhlig LLC v. Shirley, Civil Action No. 6:08-CV-01208-JMC, 2012 WL 
2923242, at 7 (D.S.C. July 17, 2012). 
144 See id.; see also Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 351, 360 (Nev. 2000) (holding that 
“circumstantial evidence” is “sufficient” to support finding that defendants 
“misappropriated trade secrets”). 
145 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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without any proof that the competitor had even stolen any trade secrets.146 The 
basis for this finding was practical in nature; the court held that “unless [the 
employee] possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he 
would necessarily be making decisions . . . by relying on his knowledge of [his 
former employer’s] trade secrets.”147 
Other courts have taken a simpler approach. In Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals, interpreting Colorado’s Uniform Trade Secret 
Act, held that no actual use of the stolen information was required.148 The 
plaintiff showed that the defendant “knowingly acquired password-protected 
information by improper means” even though defendant “did not utilize or print 
any information.”149 This conclusion was important because the court held that 
“it is irrelevant whether [the defendant] actually used [plaintiff’s] client and 
debtor information to compete against [the plaintiff] because . . . there is no 
requirement in [the Uniform Trade Secret Act] that there be actual use or 
commercial implementation of the misappropriated trade secret for damages to 
accrue.”150 Other courts which have reached the same conclusion, have found 
that an entity willing to employ improper means to obtain information will 
certainly use the information gained.151 While others have reached the same 
conclusion based only upon the lack of a “use” requirement in the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act.152 To date, no version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has 
been adopted that has specifically required use.153 
Even if use of the trade secret was required, the facts and circumstances 
behind trade secret cases nearly always create the presumption of use 
regardless of what the defendant may claim. For example, it is apparent from 
the Nevada Gaming Control Board’s Complaint against the Peppermill that the 
information Ryan Tors gathered was continuously and repeatedly shared with 
the Peppermill’s top brass.154 This sharing of information with the executives 
heavily implies that it was in fact at least reviewed by those persons. 
Otherwise, there would be no reason for them to continuously accept the 
information gathered. 
Unlike in Uhlig and Minitab, where the competitor could argue that they 
                                                          
146 Id. at 1270. 
147 Id. at 1269. 
148 Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d at 525; Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 460 F. 
Supp.2d 1177, 1184 (C.D.Cal. 2006). 
149 Id. at 525. 
150 Id. 
151 Ajuba Int’l., L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F.Supp.2d 671, 691 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
152 Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063 
(E.D. Mo. 2005); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 
346, 350 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
153 Nevada’s Uniform Trade Secret Act allows for evidence of use or distribution. 
NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.030(2) (2016). 
154 Complaint, supra note 2, at 5. 
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knew nothing of the misappropriation, the management of the Peppermill 
admitted directing and condoning Mr. Tors’ actions. In the Stipulation for 
Settlement and Order between the Peppermill and the State Gaming Control 
Board, the Peppermill admitted that between 2011 and July 12, 2013, the 
Peppermill management “knew of, approved of, and directed Mr. Tors’s 
conduct of obtaining theoretical hold percentage information from the slot 
machines of other casinos using a ‘reset’ key.”155 There is also much more 
circumstantial evidence than in either Uhlig or Minitab. Likewise, the conduct 
in this case is far beyond the “lack of candor” the Seventh Circuit found 
troubling in PepsiCo.156 
The sheer number of times the data was stolen indicates that the Peppermill 
had a program and a use for the data. Moreover, Mr. Tors admitted that he had 
stolen PAR data from the Grand Sierra Resort and other properties on multiple 
occasions over many years.157 If the data was taken out of mere curiosity and 
never used, there was no reason for Mr. Tors to continuously steal it while 
risking his livelihood each time. Furthermore, the nature of slot machine 
gambling and the data itself points towards its use. Casinos often portray 
themselves as the “loosest” in town. The data collected by Mr. Tors allowed the 
Peppermill to do so without sacrificing any profits they did not need to. In 
essence, knowing this information eliminated the guess work from operating a 
slot floor. As the information stolen by Mr. Tors would allow the Peppermill to 
operate more efficiently, it is arguably illogical to assume they did not use the 
data to do so. 
The PARs at issue here were clearly misappropriated through theft.158 
Moreover, their use is not required to show misappropriation.159 Even if it was, 
there exists ample direct and circumstantial evidence that the Peppermill was 
interested in and had a use for this data.160 
VI.    INDEPENDENT VALUE OF PAR INFORMATION 
Once secrecy has been established, the plaintiff must show that the 
information has actual or potential independent economic value that flows from 
it not being generally known.161 There have been dozens of theories put forth 
by scholars as tests for “independent value,” one of the more common theories 
                                                          
155 See id.; see also Stipulation for Settlement and Order, supra note 15, at 1. 
156 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995). 
157 Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
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159 Ajuba Int’l., L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F.Supp.2d 671, 691 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Reynolds, Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1063 (E.D. 
Mo. 2005); Smithfield Ham & Products Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 346, 
350 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
160 See Complaint, supra note 2, at 5. 
161 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
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is one of “positive value” to the secret holder.162 Some academics have gone as 
far as to declare that “positive value” to the holder of the trade secret is the first 
and most important characteristic of a trade secret.163 This way of thinking is 
based on the assumption that positive value is what makes the difference 
between a trade secret and any other secret. As an example, a recipe for a 
popular soda has positive value to the corporation that produces the soda. Other 
secrets, such as a history of tax evasion by key executives, have no positive 
value. Both would be devastating if released to the public, but only one can be 
considered a trade secret. 
As the embodiment of their strategic plans and decisions, PARs arguably 
have extraordinary positive value to the corporation. This importance would 
stem less from what the numbers were at any given time and more from the 
observable trends over time. These trends could be a kind of formula for 
success that competitors could easily copy once they had stolen it. Conversely, 
the Peppermill’s program of secretly gathering PAR information is a classic 
example of a secret that has no positive value. The PAR information program 
was devastating to the company when its existence became public because of 
the punishment it brought to the Peppermill, not because the conduct was no 
longer secret. This is the central difference between a secret that derives 
positive value from being secret and the average secret. 
Other scholars argue that the value behind a trade secret must be objective 
and transferrable from one party to another. This means that a secret must have 
potential value to any party that misappropriates it.164 For example, if one firm 
develops a novel technique for manufacturing their product and another firm 
could utilize this information to streamline their own production it has 
objective transferrable value. Alternatively, some information only has 
subjective value.165 This type of information is only useful to the party that 
possesses it and it cannot be a trade secret.166 Examples include a company’s 
human resource records. These records may be very valuable to a company and 
its ongoing operations, but would not mean anything to a competitor. The value 
cannot transfer directly to others. The aphorism “one man’s trash is another 
man’s treasure,” perfectly describes subjective information.167 When dealing 
with trade secrets, one man’s treasure must be another man’s treasure.168 
One may argue that PARs are objective and transferrable because the 
misappropriating party could make immediate use of it as soon as the 
                                                          
162 Johnson, supra note 59, at 567 (discussing that the “holder” of a trade secret 
may be either the rightful owner of the trade secret or an alleged misappropriator). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 568. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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information is in their possession. Conversely, one could also argue that PARs 
are a textbook example of one man’s trash being another’s treasure. Even 
within the casino industry, some parties may be completely uninterested in their 
competitor’s PARs, while other parties, like the Peppermill, are willing to go to 
great lengths to get them. 
There are still other possible ways to approach the question of independent 
value. Some argue that a trade secret must be emancipatable from the trade 
secret holder.169 This is similar to transferability and means that the information 
must stand on legs of its own apart from the creator.170 For example, a 
manufacturing process that is more efficient and cost effective than what 
currently exists would still have value if the company that created it went into 
bankruptcy tomorrow. It could be sold or licensed by whoever obtained it from 
the bankruptcy estate. Conversely, plans to roll out a new product might have 
strategic value to competitors, but it would be worthless if the company was 
forced to close and the product launch never happened.171 Spoilability is also 
sometimes put forth as a measure of independent value.172 Simply put, if the 
information is spoiled by disclosure, then it could be considered a trade secret. 
The rationale behind this theory of independent value is directly tied to the 
secrecy analysis above. The strongest trade secrets would be subject to both the 
emancipatable and spoilability requirements. 
Evaluated together, these tests weigh both for and against PARs as trade 
secrets. On the one hand, PARs cannot be emancipated from the property 
where they originate. If that property’s doors close tomorrow, the PARs would 
be worthless. However, the PAR holder could counter by arguing that PARs are 
incredibly spoilable. Neither party can effectively argue these factors together 
and take advantage of the powerful one-two punch that they provide. 
All of these theories work primarily in the pages of academic journals and 
are not discussed frequently in the common law. This makes their application 
difficult. Courts have however, employed a definition based approach to the 
words “independent economic value.”173 “Economic Value” is not a difficult 
term to define. A secret is worth what someone is willing to risk to obtain it. In 
this case, the Peppermill was willing to risk a great deal to obtain PARs from 
their competitors. They were willing to risk their gaming license and their 
entire operation to gain this information, so it clearly must have economic 
value to them. 
On the other hand, the word “independent” is more interesting and less 
studied. A few courts have summarily attached practical definitions to the word 
“independent” to make its application easier including the following: the fact 
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that someone would pay money to get the information;174 that the firm holding 
the information stands to lose money if the information is disclosed;175 that the 
information allows the firm having it to gain competitive advantage over firms 
not having it;176 that the information’s economic value (to the holding firm) 
comes from its secrecy;177 and that the information took a substantial amount of 
time, effort, and/or money to develop.178 
Some academics have argued that the word “independent” should mean 
that the information has the same academic value to every firm in the industry 
for the same reason and that this value exists independently of the 
information’s creator.179 This definition is effectively the “emancipatability and 
spoilability” combination test discussed above, and has not yet been applied by 
any court. However, one court has ruled that there is no trade secret when 
information is only useful to the plaintiff.180 While this is not exactly the same 
as the “emancipatability and spoilability” test, it is in the same ball park. 
As this area of trade secret law is so unsettled and the possible tests the 
court could apply is so varied any determination of who should triumph 
between the Peppermill and Grand Sierra Resort is pure speculation. It would 
most likely depend not upon the state of the law, but upon the particular judge, 
jury, or attorneys arguing the case on any given day. As such, this factor is less 
important than the others and rarely addressed in detail by the courts. 
VII.    DAMAGES 
Finally, the Plaintiff in any action for the misappropriation of trade secrets 
must establish damages. There are multiple ways and means that damages are 
evaluated and measured. The Uniform Trade Secret Act as adopted by Nevada 
allows for “damages caused by misappropriation [to] be measured by 
imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s 
                                                          
174 Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., No. 92 Civ. 3652 (JSM), 1993 WL 
541219, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (holding that the willingness of companies 
in the industry to pay for a license for the information was sufficient to raise an 
inference of independent economic value). 
175 See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1455 (Cal. App. 
2002). 
176 Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int’l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 
1309-10 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that religious material qualifies as a trade secret if 
it confers on its owner an economic advantage over competitors). 
177 E.g. Dodson Int’l. Parts, Inc. v. Altendorf, 347 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1010 (D. Kan. 
2004) (applying Kansas law); Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 
F.3d 811, 818-19 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Missouri law); Strategic Directions 
Grp., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(applying Minnesota law). 
178 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 848 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
179 Johnson, supra note 59, at 571. 
180 Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 587 (Md. App. 1991). 
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unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.”181 This approach has found 
support in multiple courts and is a concept appropriated from patent law.182 
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., the Fifth Circuit 
Court explained that the “reasonable royalty standard” measures “the value of 
the secret to the defendant” and not a more practical literal valuation that would 
be applied in other types of actions.183 This case dealt with stolen computer 
tapes that contained a retail management program called AIMES III.184 This 
system was stolen by an employee, who attempted but failed to successfully to 
find a buyer for it.185 Despite the fact that it was never sold, the court still held 
that plaintiff was entitled to reasonable royalty for the program, even though 
“no actual profits exist by which to value the worth to the defendants of what 
they misappropriated.”186 The court continued that “the lack of actual profits 
does not insulate the defendants from being obliged to pay for what they have 
wrongfully obtained in the mistaken belief their theft would benefit them.”187 
The court ultimately concluded “that the risk of defendants’ venture, using the 
misappropriated secret, should not be placed on the injured plaintiff, but rather 
the defendants must bear the risk of failure themselves.”188 
Since the “reasonable royalty” approach has its roots in patent law, patent 
cases are instructive when evaluating damages for misappropriating trade 
secrets.189 In patent law, when determining “reasonable royalties” actual profit 
earned after the infringement are only “among the factors to be considered in 
determining a reasonable royalty.”190 Further, “the law does not require that an 
                                                          
181 NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.050(1) (2016). 
182 See also Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 
2014) (holding language in Uniform Trade Secret Act stating that “[i]n lieu of 
damages measured by any other methods,” provides that reasonable royalty 
damages are a “general option”); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, 
LLC, No. 08-0840-CV-W-ODS, 2012 WL 3047308, at 3 (W.D. Mo. July 25, 2012) 
(ruling, under the Uniform Trade Secret Act, that plaintiff may elect to recover the 
royalty value of its trade secrets in lieu of damages measured by both plaintiff’s 
loss and defendant’s unjust enrichment). 
183 University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
184 Id. at 529. 
185 Id. at 533-34. 
186 Id. at 536, 540. 
187 Id. at 536. 
188 Id. 
189 See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 411 S.W.3d 581, 609 (Tex. App. 
2013) (explaining the “use of a ‘reasonable royalty’ in the calculation of damages 
in trade secret misappropriation cases was borrowed from patent infringement 
cases”); Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 310 (Iowa 1998) (explaining 
that “[g]iven the difficulty of assessing damages in trade secret cases, courts have 
frequently analogized damages in a trade secret action to those measures of 
damages usually employed in patent infringement cases” including damages based 
on “reasonable royalties”). 
190 Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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infringer be permitted to make a profit.”191 This would transform the royalty 
into “a form of compulsory license,” granted “against the will and interest of 
the person wronged, [and] in favor of the wrongdoer.”192 
In Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a large 
jury verdict for the misappropriation of trade secrets.193 This royalty award was 
upheld despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not show that the Defendant made 
commercial use of the trade secret.194 The court clarified that any requirement 
that a party prove commercial use to obtain damages calculated under a 
reasonable royalty theory were based on “the common law’s requirements . . . 
well before the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”195 This is because 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as adopted in every state provides for 
reasonable royalty damages for cases involving disclosure or use.196 This 
approach makes logical sense because of the inherent complexity involved in 
proving these damages when all of the evidence needed is in the hands of the 
defendant.197 This fact alone “may be enough to explain why a state would 
wish to make reasonable royalty awards generally available to misappropriation 
plaintiffs” as “it is hardly unknown for the law to resolve ambiguities about the 
appropriate quantity of damages against the proven wrongdoer rather than his 
victim.”198 
Other courts have employed a slightly different method to determine 
reasonable royalties including “hypothetical negotiations between a willing 
licensor and willing licensee.”199 The court in Fromson explained: 
[the] methodology encompasses fantasy and flexibility; 
fantasy because it requires a court to imagine what 
warring parties would have agreed to as willing 
negotiators; flexibility because it speaks of negotiations 
as of the time infringement began, yet permits and often 
requires a court to look to events and facts that occurred 
thereafter and that could not have been known to or 
predicted by the hypothesized negotiators.200 
It is important to note that trade secret cases are often not a “willing 
licensor/willing licensee’ negotiation . . . as the [plaintiff] does not wish to 
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192 Id. 
193 Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2014). 
194 Id. at 1183, 1186. 
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v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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grant a license.”201 For that reason, the Sixth Circuit held the “setting of a 
reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equivalent of 
ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’” parties because that “view 
would constitute a pretense that the infringement never happened.”202 This 
would also grant competitors the ability to effectively force a “compulsory 
license” on their competition where “the infringer would have nothing to lose, 
and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine 
royalty non-infringers might have paid.”203 To prevent this from occurring, the 
courts have wide latitude to determine what a proper royalty should be. Courts 
often consider the “opinion testimony of qualified experts, the [plaintiff’s] 
relationship with the infringer, and other factors that might warrant higher 
damages.”204 
This approach stems from the principle “that every case requires a flexible 
and imaginative approach to the problem of damages.”205 The overarching 
principle is that “[w]here the damages are uncertain, we do not feel that 
uncertainty should preclude recovery; the plaintiff should be afforded every 
opportunity to prove damages once the misappropriation is shown.”206 Courts 
in other jurisdictions have also applied this same standard.207 Regardless of 
whatever other methods are used to determine damages, general royalties 
remains as a “general option” for the courts to pursue.208 
PAR data presents an interesting testing ground for the “reasonable 
royalty” theory of trade secret damages. On one hand, PARS have no obvious 
commercial value and so any theory of damages based upon royalties would 
seem unlikely to succeed. Experts could argue that PARs cannot be trade 
secrets and so it is not possible to sustain damages for their misappropriation. 
They could cite the fact that no one has ever released the PAR information of 
their casino floor to a competitor for any kind of royalty. This approach makes 
logical sense and would likely win the day in any other type of case. However, 
it is inconsistent with the established case law of trade secrets. It overlooks the 
fact that trade secret cases are inherently punitive in nature. 
The aggrieved party should approach the “reasonable royalty” standard in a 
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way that is more analogous with trade secret case law. As in Storage Craft, 
where the plaintiff was not required to show evidence of commercial use, it 
would be impractical to require the plaintiff in a trade secrets action to establish 
damages when all the evidence required to do so is held by the other side. This 
problem is addressed by the court’s reasoning in University Computing Co., the 
court pointed out that the “reasonable royalty standard” meant the value of the 
trade secret to the defendant and not the plaintiff, effectively side stepping the 
issue entirely.209 Approaching the issue of damages from this direction allows 
the PAR holder to articulate the subjective worth of the information and does 
not require them to prove actual damages. Any other approach would allow a 
bad actor to hide behind the inherent difficulty of determining the financial 
value of information such as PARs. 
Courts have also evaluated the value of trade secrets and damages based 
upon what a party is willing to risk to obtain the trade secret. In AvidAir 
Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the Eighth Circuit Court 
identified “repeated attempts” to secure plaintiff’s trade secrets by improper or 
“reprehensible means” and held that they demonstrated the value of the trade 
secret to the infringing party.210 This was one of the key factors that allowed 
the court to uphold the jury’s verdict for $350,000 in actual damages as 
reasonable.211 Other courts have also recently applied this same standard.212 
The Peppermill’s actions show the value of the PAR information and the 
damages they should face. The Peppermill’s system of electronic espionage 
could have cost the company its gaming license and devastated its reputation 
throughout the state of Nevada. The Peppermill potentially faced multiple 
lawsuits — and possibly even criminal charges — at both the state and federal 
level. It is fair to say that no reasonable person, let alone corporation, would 
risk these consequences unless they stood to gain something of substantial 
value. Based upon this inherent value, a party could easily argue that it is 
entitled to damages for the misappropriation of its PARs. 
Other courts have applied other flexible and imaginative approaches to 
determining damages. For instance, in Mid-Michigan Computer Sys., Inc. v. 
Marc Glassman, Inc., software used to maintain prescription and billing 
records for customers was licensed for use between the parties.213 Part of this 
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agreement included a “Source Code Agreement” that made the code behind the 
program accessible in emergency situations.214 Glassman, Inc. used this 
agreement to access the code, copy it, and create new software to replace what 
they had previously licensed.215 When Mid-Michigan prevailed in court on 
their trade secret claims, they were granted damages based upon a liquidated 
damages clause in the contract.216 The defendant argued that because the source 
code agreement wasn’t breached, it was not an accurate measure of damages. 
The Sixth Circuit held that even though this agreement was not breached, it still 
provided “a benchmark for estimating what the parties would have agreed to as 
a fair licensing price.” Had it been unreasonable, they assumed that the parties 
would not have agreed to it.217 The court applied this novel approach because 
“the precise value of a trade secret may be difficult to determine.”218 However, 
the overarching principle is that “by sanctioning the acquisition, use, and 
disclosure of another’s valuable, proprietary information by improper means, 
trade secret law minimizes ‘the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society 
when one . . . steals from another.’”219 
Other less common methods of determining damages in trade secret cases 
include lost profits and unjust enrichment.220 Lost profits can be a logical 
approach to formulating damages as it attempts to formulate the profits that 
would have been made if no misappropriation had occurred.221 In Salsbury 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Merieux Laboratories, Inc. the Court took the sales made 
by the defendant and awarded the plaintiff the profits they would have made if 
they had made the lost sales.222 This approach can be difficult logistically as it 
is not always clear what lost profits would be when the misappropriated 
information is not a traditional trade secret.223 Unjust enrichment is a simpler 
proposition for most courts and provides a remedy when lost profits would be 
impractical.224 Neither of these approaches is logically applied to the 
misappropriation of PAR data and so they will not be discussed at length here. 
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CONCLUSION: FINDING A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
After years of pleadings and discovery, the Grand Sierra Resort and the 
Peppermill eventually met in court.225 Ultimately, the jury was not convinced 
that theoretical hold percentages were trade secrets.226 However, the Grand 
Sierra Resort quickly appealed this decision based upon issues that arose 
throughout litigation and the jury instructions given by the court. This appeal is 
currently pending before the Nevada Supreme Court with oral arguments to be 
heard at a later date. This case presents a number of issues of first impression 
for the court to decide regarding trade secret law in the state of Nevada. 
Based upon case law and the reasoning presented above, the Nevada 
legislature should enshrine in Nevada law several crucial concepts. First, trade 
secret cases are highly fact-specific and assumptions either way should not be 
made. Nonetheless, a trade secret must not be quickly ascertainable or be so 
“self-revealing” as to be ascertainable “at a glance.”227 Additionally, whether a 
secret can be reverse engineered is immaterial to this trade secret determination 
unless the defendant claims to have actually reverse engineered the trade secret 
instead of obtaining it improperly.228 Assuming these elements are met, the 
information must also be protected by common, reasonable security measures 
to protect the alleged trade secret.229 
When a trade secret is obtained by “(a) [t]heft;(b) [b]ribery; (c) 
[m]isrepresentation; (d) [w]illful breach or willful inducement of a breach of a 
duty to maintain secrecy; (e) [w]illful breach or willful inducement of a breach 
of a duty imposed by common law, statute, contract, license, protective order or 
other court or administrative order; and (f) [e]spionage through electronic or 
                                                          
225 See Jason Hidalgo, Jury Rules in Favor of Peppermill in Grand Sierra Resort 
Trade Secrets Case, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.rgj.com/story/ 
money/gaming/2016/01/27/jury-clears-peppermill-grand-sierra-resort-trade-secrets-
case/79408290/. 
226 See generally id; see also Complaint, supra note 2, at 5 (defining theoretical 
hold percentages). 
227 See Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., No. 08 C 5427, 2012 WL 74319, at 19 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that trade secret protection is applicable assuming 
the secret does “not involve self-revealing information that any user or passer-by 
sees at a glance”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) 
(specifying that the protected information need not “be unascertainable at all by 
proper means, but only that they not be readily or quickly ascertainable by such 
means”); Nat’l Instrument Labs., Inc. v. Hycel, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (D. 
Del. 1979) (stating that secrets that are “ascertainable at a glance” will lose 
protections); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that 
cargo container, available on the open market and accessible to defendant for 
inspection, was a protectable trade secret because there was no evidence that the 
“construction of which was ascertainable at a glance”). 
228 AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 973 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
229 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, et al., 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
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other means,”230 the factfinder should assume a rebuttable presumption that the 
information constitutes a trade secret and has been misappropriated. Cases 
should not end as soon as the misconduct is shown, but the presumption should 
be strong. 
Next, the plaintiff should not be required to show that the defendant used 
the secret or gained financially from it when misappropriation has been 
established. Ruling otherwise would reward the misappropriator of the secret 
and place an unfair burden on the wronged party. For these same reasons, the 
plaintiff should only be required to show that the misappropriated trade secret 
has positive value to them. The trade secret obviously has value to the party 
who misappropriated it, so no more analysis should be required. 
Finally, as trade secret cases are so fact specific, the finder of fact should 
be free to determine damages under any theory that is appropriate. This will 
allow a wide variety of theories to be considered by the judge or jury and for 
them to reach the most equitable results, and when necessary, take punitive 
action against the misappropriating party. Likewise, the defendant would still 
have the appellate courts to turn to for redress if the damages entered against 
them are unreasonable. 
Upon hearing the Jury Verdict, Bill Paganetti, the Peppermill’s General 
Manager said to the media, “We are extremely pleased with the verdict. Once 
again, we express our apologies to the gaming community for our mistakes.”231 
As there was no affirmative guidance on the topic at hand in Nevada, a 
deliberate, multi-year effort to steal valuable information from competitors was 
reduced to a “mistake” made and was excused with a short apology. If juries 
are armed with proper instructions based on clearly established caselaw, then 
they will be empowered and confident enough to return appropriate verdicts. 
With this adjustment to existing Nevada law, any company that is able to cheat 
their competitors will not be able to cheat the law and the corporation who was 
one of the largest slot cheats in gaming history will not escape the 
consequences of their actions. 
 
                                                          
230 NEV. REV. STAT § 600A.030(1) (2016). 
231 Hidalgo, supra note 225. 
